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Economic Evaluation of Cropshare and Cash Lease Contracts in  
South Dakota and Nebraska1 
 
Dr. Larry Janssen, Dr. John Cole, Ms. Xuan Xu, and Dr. Bruce Johnson 2 
 
Abstract 
Factors influencing choice of share or cash rental leases for cropland are examined using a 1996 
dataset containing 1071 lease contracts in Nebraska and in South Dakota. Logistic regression 
results indicate tenant’s age, capital position, and relationship with landlord were more important 
than leased land use or crop management variables. 
 
Introduction 
 
Agricultural land rental markets are an important component of the organization of 
production in the Northern Plains.  The leasing of farmland has changed from the full tenant of the 
past to the part-owner operator of today.  In 1997, part owners operated 60 percent of all farms 
and 71 percent of all farmland in the United States.  Leasing is no longer viewed by many as a step 
towards full ownership but rather an effective way to gain control of land resources.  Leasing of 
crop, hay, and pasture land is being used by agricultural producers as a management tool to expand 
or contract their operation, conserve limited capital, finance farm operations, increase management 
flexibility, and reduce risk.  An estimated 44 percent of the total land in farms in Nebraska and 39 
percent of the land in farms in South Dakota is leased.  These percentages are consistent for the 
states bordering Nebraska and South Dakota, with the rate of land in farms leased varying from 35 
to 55 percent (1997 Census of Agriculture).  
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 Study Purpose, Data, and Methods  
In this study, we examine economic characteristics of cropland lease arrangements in South 
Dakota and Nebraska and revisit the issue of contract choice between cropshare and cash leases in 
both states.  Allen and Lueck (1992) developed a logit model to examine the contract choice of 
cash rent versus cropshare leases.  Their model was applied to data from a 1986 survey of farmland 
leasing contracts in South Dakota and Nebraska.  We plan to re-estimate and extend their 
econometric model of leasing contract choice using a more recent (1996) data set of cropland 
leasing arrangements in both states. 
A major pilot study of agricultural land leasing markets in 1986 was completed by  the 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln and South Dakota State University.  This effort included a mail 
survey of both farm operators and non-operators landlords involved in land rental agreements in 
Nebraska and South Dakota (Johnson et. al., 1988).  
South Dakota and Nebraska were selected for these studies in part because both states are 
located in the Northern Plains transition region characterized by wide variations in agricultural and 
climatic conditions and thus in cropland leasing practices.  The dominant types of agriculture from 
east to west in these states are: 1) western Cornbelt agriculture characterized by non-irrigated corn, 
soybean, and small grain enterprises and may include hog, dairy, or beef cattle enterprises, 2) 
transitional (semiarid) agriculture characterized by irrigated and some non-irrigated corn, soybeans, 
wheat, oats, and other small grains, and  3) Great Plains agriculture characterized by beef cattle, 
sheep, and wheat farms and ranches and some irrigated specialty crops.  These agricultural settings 
developed in response to climatic differences and were also influenced by land settlement patterns, 
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urban/regional trade center sizes, and other socio-economic/demographic patterns that influence 
farmland values, rental arrangements, and institutions (Johnson et. al., 1988).  
In order to establish a new comprehensive benchmark of agricultural land leasing data, a 
total of 5,800 farmers in South Dakota and Nebraska received the 1996 Cropland Leasing Survey. 
 Stratified random sampling procedures were used to select the sample of farm operators in different 
regions of both states.  The data set was constructed from the mail survey questions on cropland 
leasing arrangements completed by 1343 farm operators in 1996.  Key sections of the 1996 and 
1986 leasing surveys can be directly compared.  The 1996 survey contains more questions about 
management practices in each type of leasing agreement, while the 1986 survey included responses 
from farmers and non-operator landlords leasing farmland. 
Cropland Rental Market Characteristics 
Farm operators in South Dakota and Nebraska leasing cropland typically operate small to 
medium size farms of less than 2000 acres with less than $500,000 gross farm sales.  Three-fifths of 
South Dakota and 72 percent of Nebraska cropland renters rely on net farm income for the 
majority of their household income (Table 1). 
Most agricultural producers operate owned and leased land. A majority of leased cropland 
acres in both states are in cropshare leases. The majority of tenants reported participation in at least 
one crop share lease also reported participation in at least one cash lease, with 39 percent of renters 
in both states involved in both types of leases (Table 1).   
Farmland renters in South Dakota and Nebraska average more than three farmland leases 
(Table 1).  Nearly 65 percent of renters have leases with two or more landowners with the majority 
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of rented cropland leased by tenants from three or more landlords.  Contact between tenant and 
landowner is fairly frequent.  Most tenants reported having four or more management contacts per 
year with their landlords (Cole, 2000). 
Most rental agreements for cropland were reported as leases from unrelated individuals or 
relatives.  Approximately one-half of rented farmland acres are leased from unrelated individuals, 
three-eighths are leased from parents or other relatives, and one-eighth of rented farmland acres are 
leased from government, tribal, or corporate entities (Cole, 2000; Xu, 2002). The incidence of 
leasing farmland by type of landlord is shown in Table 2. One-half of respondents lease some 
cropland from local unrelated individuals, while more than one-third lease some land from parents 
and/or from other relatives.  
Individually, most cropland leases are oral, annual leases.  Cash leases are more likely to be 
written, multi-year leases in Nebraska and oral, annual leases in South Dakota. Most individual 
lease agreements between tenant and landowner have been in effect for extended periods (> 10 
years).  Most tenants were very satisfied or generally satisfied with their cropland leases.  
Satisfaction levels were reported higher with crop share leases than with cash leases, yet there is a 
trend toward more cash leasing (Table 3). 
The majority of cropland leased in South Dakota and Nebraska are in crop share leases, 
while most rented pasture are in cash leases. The 60-40 or 50-50 tenant-landlord share lease is 
prevalent for non-irrigated cropland leases in eastern Nebraska and southeastern South Dakota and 
are dominant for irrigated cropland leases. The 2/3 – 1/3 share lease is dominant for non-irrigated 
crops in most of South Dakota and in western Nebraska. The incidence and extent of sharing input 
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costs varies systematically by output share for non- irrigated and irrigated crop leases. Almost all 
irrigated and most non-irrigated crop shareleases have cost sharing for one or more variable inputs. 
The number of shared inputs increases as the landlord’s share of output increases from 1/3 to 2/5 to 
½.  For shared inputs, almost all cropshare leases have these input costs shared in the same 
proportion as the share of crop output (Cole, 2000; Xu, 2002). 
Contract Choice of Cash and Cropshare Leases – Revisited 
 Considerable economic literature exists on the rationale for various contractual 
arrangements in agriculture including land leasing. More detailed literature reviews of land leasing 
articles were included in recent theses completed by Cole (2000) and Xu (2002) and a recent RAE 
review article on evolution of land leasing models by Dasgupta et.al. (1999). In this paper, we revisit 
the issue of contract choice of cash rent vs. cropshare leasing as developed by Allen and Leuck 
(1992) using 1986 data from landowners and tenants leasing cropland in Nebraska and South 
Dakota (Johnson, et.al. 1988, Janssen and Peterson, 1988) 
  The basic approach is to examine the conceptual model and actual variables reported in the 
Allen and Leuck (A/L) study and re-estimate the coefficients for the same variables using the more 
recent 1996 dataset of cropland leases in South Dakota and Nebraska.  Next, we extend their 
basic model by adding possible explanatory variables that were not available in the 1986 dataset or 
not included in their empirical model. 
 Allen and Leuck assume the relevant choice is to lease cropland, instead of owner 
cultivation, and the important choice is between a cash rent and cropshare contract. The two main 
inputs are farmland supplied by landowners and farm capital (both human and physical) owned by 
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farmer-renters and both parties are risk-neutral. A lease contract is not selected unless both parties 
expect to benefit (joint wealth-maximization). Actual crop output amount and quality level is subject 
to random fluctuation and considerable uncertainty, which implies the landowner cannot effectively 
monitor the input levels applied by observing output. Cropshare contracts have less total input 
distortion than a cash lease, but incur costs associated with accurate division of the output and from 
both parties marketing their share of the crop output. Cash leases are fixed payments per acre and 
the farmer receives the entire crop output. According to A/L, in annual cash leases the farmer-renter 
supplies the optimal amounts of farm capital inputs but has possible incentives to overuse the land 
input by intensive cropping practices that deplete soil moisture, reduce soil fertility, increase erosion 
rates, etc. Thus the contract choice problem is the trade-off between output-division costs and 
input-distortion costs within a framework of joint wealth maximization (Allen and Leuck, 1992, pp. 
403). 
In general, share leases are preferred when the “costs” of dividing the crop output are 
relatively low and the potential to exploit the land resource (soil erosion, moisture, fertility etc) is 
relatively high. Cash leases are more likely when the costs of output division (and monitoring quality 
levels) are high and when the potential costs of exploiting the land resource are relatively low.  
 The type and extent of relationships between landlord and renter can also be included in 
leasing contract choice models if it is assumed that relationships can alter costs of contract 
monitoring and compliance. It is important to note that farm lease decisions are made within a legal 
framework of common law, state statutes, and various Federal policies. 
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Model Specification and Variable Selection 
 The logistic regression procedure is used to estimate the likelihood of a cropshare contract 
compared to a cash lease. Logistic regression analysis often used to investigate the relationship 
between the response probability and the explanatory variables (Allison, 1999)  The response, Y, is 
a binary (0,1) variable representing the cropland lease decision. Let X denote a vector of 
explanatory variables and p = pr(Y=1/X) is the response probability to be modeled. The linear 
logistic regression model has the form logit (p) = log (p/ (1-p)) = a + b’X, where p is the probability 
of selecting a specific lease (share lease in this study),  ‘a’ is the intercept parameter, and ‘b’ is the 
vector of slope parameters.  
 The dependent (response) variable, CONTRACT, is the cropland lease choice decision 
with a value of 1 for a crop share lease and 0 for a cash lease. The explanatory variables include 
land use, management practices, and location attributes on the cropland tract leased; farm business 
and demographic characteristics; and relationships between renter and landlord. The list of variable 
names, definition, and simple statistics from the 1996 dataset are shown in Table 4. The variables in 
bold script are those included in the contract choice model reported by Allen and Lueck (1992) 
using the 1986 dataset. 
 Tract size (ACRES) and land uses of the leased tract are some key explanatory variables. 
Irrigation is an important method of crop production ,especially in Nebraska, and is capital and 
management intensive. Irrigated crop yields are much higher and relatively more stable than non-
irrigated cropland yields in the same locality. Allen and Lueck suggested that irrigated tracts are 
more likely to be cash leased as irrigation reduces the need to conserve soil moisture. Two 
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alternative specifications for irrigated leased tracts are used in alternative models, incidence of 
irrigated cropland (IRRIGATE) or percent of leased tract acres in irrigated crop production 
(IRRPCT), and the predicted signs are negative.  
Some leased cropland tracts are also used for hay production that requires minimal tillage 
(except for establishment). Also since hay output and quality levels are more difficult to measure at 
harvest and transport / storage costs as a percent of value are relatively high, cropland tracts with 
hay production are more likely to be cash leased. Again two alternative specifications for hay land 
use are used, incidence of hay (HAY) on leased tracts or percent of leased tract acres in hay 
production (HAYPCT), and the predicted signs are negative. 
Some leased cropland tracts also have pasture, especially in the central and western regions 
of both states. Most pasture tracts are cash leased, due in part to the high costs of monitoring and 
sharing livestock performance gains, and mixed cropland – pasture tracts are more likely to be cash 
leased. Alternative explanatory variables are incidence of leased cropland tracts with pasture 
(PASTURE) or percent of leased acres used for pasture (RNGPCT) and that predicted signs are 
negative. The amount of pastureland per leased cropland tract is only available in the more recent 
(1996) dataset. 
Selection of cropping pattern over time is an important management decision for renters 
and/or landowners. Corn and alfalfa hay have been and continue to be the major irrigated crops in 
both states, while increasing corn and soybean acres are replacing less profitable small grains 
(wheat, oats, rye, and barley) in crop rotations in the Northern Plains.  Thus, incidence of  rowcrop 
only (ROWC) cropping patterns are increasing in both states. Allen and Leuck suggested that 
 
 
9
leased tracts with only rowcrops are more likely to be share leased, as tillage levels increase and 
potential for soil erosion or moisture loss is higher. 
Interaction terms for various land use combinations are included as control variables 
(ROWCHAY, ROWCPAST, and HAYPAST) in selected models. The variable ROWCHAY was 
the only interaction term used in the 1986 A/L study as pasture data were not available. 
Farmers lease cropland from various types of landlords and long-term relationships between 
renter and landlord are common (see data in tables 2 and 3). Leasing cropland from parents or 
other relatives often involves more interaction and knowledge about the situation of each party than 
leases from other individuals or institutions. Cropland leases between family members or relatives 
(FAMILY) should more likely be share leases, compared to greater incidence of cash leases from 
nonlocal (ABSENT) individuals unrelated to the renter. 
Farmers may also lease land from corporations or from federal, state, tribal, or local 
governmental entities (INSTITUTION). In most cases, the agents for these formal landlords are 
more likely to want the certain return of a cash lease and less likely to monitor tenant performance 
and accept the uncertain returns from a share lease.  
AGE , CAPITAL, and FARMINC are included in all models. Allen and Leuck  (1992) 
suggested increasing AGE is negatively related to cropshare leasing following the idea of the 
“agricultural ladder.”  Farmers facing a greater capital constraint would more likely participate in a 
share lease where input cost sharing occurs and output is divided after harvest, instead of partial or 
full cash payment before harvest in a cash lease. Farmers owning a greater share of their land 
operation, CAPITAL, usually have a lower capital constraint and would more likely engage in a 
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cash lease, thus implying a negative coefficient for CAPITAL. Greater dependence on net farm 
income for family living expenses implies a positive coefficient for FARMINC and greater tendency 
for share leasing, if tenant risk aversion is present. However, risk-averse landlords would be 
expected to prefer a cash lease. 
DENSITY was included as a proxy for extent of urbanization and development potential for 
farmland in the county of the leased tract. The predicted sign is negative as potential land use shifts 
favor cash lease rates that are above returns from a share lease. 
Conservation management, PRACTICE, and tillage practices, TILLAGE, on the leased 
tract were not included in the earlier study as data were not available. Allen and Lueck (1992) 
suggest  “cropshare is more likely to be chosen when tillage becomes more important because the 
potential for land exploitation is greater” (pp. 410). We include conservation management practices 
and index of soil loss from tillage practices on the leased tract as possible measures, but have no 
apriori expectations on coefficient sign. 
 Two additional variables, STATE and ORAL, were not included in the earlier study. 
STATE is a control variable used to reflect different regional outcomes in cash or share leasing not 
captured by land use, farm operator, and lease specific variables. Cash leases are more likely to be 
written and may include specific cropland management control provisions. Share leases often imply 
some landlord involvement in management decision-making and flexibility in renegotiating resource 
use during a growing season as crop conditions change. An oral cropshare lease provides greater 
flexibility if tenant and landlord remain in contact with each other. Thus we predict a positive 
coefficient for the ORAL variable. 
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Empirical Results 
The dataset used to empirically estimate the model coefficients are from 1182 cropland 
lease agreements in Nebraska and South Dakota. Due to missing values for various explanatory 
variables, only 1071 cropland leases are included in the empirical models shown in Table 5.  The 
data for 1071 cropland leases were obtained from 760 respondents to the 1996 cropland leasing 
survey conducted in both states. A logistic regression program (PROC LOGISTIC in SAS/STAT, 
Version 8) was used to estimate the coefficients of the cropland leasing models. Maximum 
likelihood procedures were used in all models. Full model I contain the 1996 results for the 
variables used in the farmer-sample of the 1986 dataset reported by Allen and Lueck. Stepwise 
model I is a stepwise version (backward elimination) of Full Model I with a 0.15 probability level 
cutoff for exiting variables. Stepwise model II was estimated from an alternative full model specified 
by the authors that include all variables considered in model I plus added variables discussed earlier. 
Stepwise model III is an alternative version where land use percentage variables are substituted for 
land use incidence variables in models I and II. 
In both versions of model I, coefficients are significant (p<0.01) for the variables HAY, 
ROWCHAY, FAMILY, AGE, and CAPITAL while the coefficient for INSTITUTION is 
statistically significant at p<0.07.  The negative coefficients for HAY, INSTITUTION, and 
CAPITAL were expected and are related to greater incidence of cash leasing. The positive 
coefficient for FAMILY indicates share leasing is more likely to occur when the tenant is renting 
land from parents or other relatives. The positive coefficient for AGE indicates that older renters are 
more likely to share lease cropland than younger renters, contrary to the “agricultural ladder” 
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hypothesis, but in accord with the trend to more cash leasing which is more likely to impact younger, 
perhaps less established, farmers. Also respondent AGE is highly correlated with the number of 
years the specific tract has been leased which is closely related to the incidence of share leasing (see 
table 3). 
The coefficients for IRRIGATE, ROWC, ACRES, DENSITY, and for FARMINC were 
not significant as p>0.25 in all cases. The signs of these coefficients were the same as apriori 
predictions (compare Tables 4 and 5). 
In comparing model I results to A/L model results for the farmer-sample in the 1986 
dataset, it is important to note that the 1996 dataset has a considerably lower proportion of 
cropshare leases (0.54 vs. 0.653), higher proportion of rowcrop only incidence (0.796 vs. 0.662), 
and higher age of farmer than reported in the 1986 dataset. The coefficients for IRRIGATE, ROW, 
and INSTITUTION were statistically significant (p<0.05) in the earlier dataset while coefficients for 
HAY, FAMILY, and AGE were not significant. The actual and predicted signs of the coefficients 
were the same except for AGE, which also had a positive sign in the earlier dataset (Allen and 
Lueck, 1992, pp. 411-415). 
Results from models II and III, which includes additional explanatory variables, indicate that 
coefficients for hay and/or pasture land use and for individual tenant-landlord relationships 
(FAMILY and ABSENT) were statistically significant, mostly at the p<0.01 level and had the 
predicted signs. However, the coefficient for INSTITUTION retained a negative sign but was not 
significant in the expanded models II and III.  The positive sign for the AGE coefficient and negative 
sign for CAPITAL were highly significant in all models. The coefficients for ORAL and STATE 
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were positive and highly significant in both model II and III indicating that oral lease and cropland 
leases in Nebraska were more likely to be cropshare leases, than written leases or cropland leases 
in South Dakota.  
Coefficients for irrigation, rowcrop, contract acres, and population density were not 
statistically significant in any logistic regression model examined using the 1996 dataset. Also 
coefficients for conservation management and tillage practice variables were insignificant indicating 
little if any relationship to incidence of cropshare or cash leasing.  
The C index of rank correlation, which assumes a value between 0 and 1, is used for 
assessing the predictive ability of a model. The closer the C index value is to 1.0 the better the 
predictive ability. Model I (full and stepwise) have C-index values of 0.598, while the stepwise 
models II and III have C-index values of 0.683 and 0.685 respectively. Based on the chi-square 
tests for covariates in all models, the combined effect for all explanatory variables are significantly 
different from zero with a p-value of <0.001. 
Selected Implications  
 Traditional thought suggests share leases are preferred if the tenant is young and climbing the 
tenure ladder or if land exploitation is a consideration.  Results from this study reject this and 
indicate that older producers are more likely to be involved in a share lease.  This may reflect the 
longer-term nature of successful landowner/tenant relationships some of which may be between 
family members or successful farm producers shift some of the risk of crop production to the 
landowner to help insure survivability.  Regardless, it is likely share leases will remain a viable option 
into the future. 
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 Results from this study reject the hypotheses that lease preference is related to conservation 
or tillage practices needed or even required on the tract.  Leases for cropland tend to be relatively 
long term relationships of at least ten years allowing tenants to capture benefits from long-term 
improvements to the tract regardless if the cost was shared initially.  Combined, this suggests that 
tenant’s stewardship of leased and owned land is the same regardless of ownership or lease type.  
 Crop-related uses were not important explanatory variables, while hay and pasture 
variables indicate mixed land use tracts tend to be cash leased instead of  primarily share leasing 
cropland and cash leasing the hay or pasture. 
 Finally, if most traditional factors are not influencing selection of lease type, then social 
factors such as local customs, values, and beliefs should be included in future models examining 
lease preference. The relatively low concordant scores (C-index of 0.599 to 0.685) suggests further 
improvements can be made in modeling leasing decisions. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Farm Operator Respondents, 
Nebraska and South Dakota, 1996 
 
Characteristic Nebraska South Dakota 
Acres Operated: percent of respondents 
        50-499 42 37 
      500-999 29 24 
    1000-1999 17 21 
    2000 or more 13 18 
   
Ag Land Operated: percent of acres operated 
    Owned 53 57 
    Leased 47 43 
   
Leased Cropland Acres In: percent of leased 
cropland acres 
    Share Lease 62 55 
    Cash Lease 38 45 
   
Avg. Number of: average number per renter 
    Leases 3.5 3.2 
    Landlords 3.2 2.8 
   
Crop Lease Type: percent of respondents 
    Cash only 22 36 
    Share only 39 25 
    Both Share & Cash 39 39 
   
Gross Farm Sales ($1000): percent of respondents 
     Less than 100 56 59 
     100-249 27 28 
     250-499 11 9 
     500 or more 9 4 
   
Operator Age:   
     20-44 31 30 
     45-64 45 42 
     65 or more 24 28 
   
Net Farm Income to Household Income:  
     Less than 30% 18 23 
     30-49% 10 16 
     50-79% 20 22 
     80% or more 52 39 
   
  Source: 1996 Cropland Leasing Survey, Nebraska and South Dakota 
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Table 2. Percent of Respondents Leasing Land by Type of Landlord 
 
 Nebraska South Dakota 
Type of landlord: percent of respondents 
    Relatives leasing some land from 
    Parents or in-laws 44 32 
    Other relatives 35 28 
    Unrelated Individuals   
    Local 50 49 
    Non-local Instate 26 16 
    Non-local Out-of-State 21 28 
    Institution   
    Government/Tribal 8 7 
    Corporation 8 3 
 
Source: 1996 Cropland Leasing Survey, South Dakota and Nebraska 
 
Table 3. Characteristics of Cropshare and Cash Leases, Nebraska and South Dakota 
 
Lease Characteristics Cropshare Lease Cash Lease 
 NE SD NE SD 
Size (avg. acres) 271 265 285 350 
Length (avg. years) 14.9 13.7 11.3 11.7 
  
The lease is: percent of respondents per lease type  
Oral 66 81 40 57 
Written 34 19 60 43 
     
Annual 59 67 55 63 
Multiyear 41 33 45 37 
  
Satisfaction with Lease percent of respondents 
Very or Somewhat Dissatisfied 6 4 11 12 
Generally Satisfied 46 55 55 54 
Very Satisfied 48 41 34 34 
     
Change in Past Five (5) Years percent of respondents reporting changes 
Landownership 10 10 10 12 
     
Cropshare to Cash n.a. n.a. 12 12 
Cash Lease Rate n.a. n.a. 44 47 
     
Cash to Cropshare 0 1 n.a. n.a. 
Change in the Inputs Shared 0 4 n.a. n.a. 
 
Source: 1996 Cropland Leasing survey, Nebraska and South Dakota 
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Table 4. Variable Name, Definitions, Simple Statistics, and Predicted Sign in Logistic 
Regression Models: Cropshare vs. Cash Rent 
 
Dependent 
Variable Definition Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Sign 
Y=Contract y = 1 if cropshare lease, = 0 if cash lease 0.532 0.499  
Explanatory 
Variables     
Acres Number of acres in contract (lease) 249.5 274.2 ? 
Irrigate 1 if irrigated crop acres are in lease, 0 otherwise 0.332 0.471 - 
Hay 1 if hay acres are in lease, 0 otherwise 0.188 0.391 - 
Pasture 1 if pasture acres are in lease, 0 otherwise 0.213 0.410 - 
Rowc 1 if row crops are only crop acres (corn, soybean, 
sunflowers, milo, or sugar beets) 
0 if wheat, oats, or other small grains are included 
0.796 0.403 + 
Rowc hay Rowc * Hay 0.155 0.362 ? 
Rowcpast Rowc * Pasture 0.173 0.378 ? 
Haypast Hay * Pasture 0.094 0.292 ? 
Family 1 if landlord are parents or relative, 0 otherwise 0.394 0.489 + 
Institution 1 if landlord is corporation or Federal, state, or tribal 
agency, 0 otherwise 
0.064 0.245 - 
Absent 1 if landlord is nonlocal individual unrelated to renter 0.232 0.423 ? 
Capital Proportion of farmland acres operated that is owned by 
renter 
0.354 0.283 - 
Farminc Dependence on net farm income as percent of  
 household income:  =1   < 30%      =2   30– 49%  
                                = 3   50–79%   = 4     >= 80% 
3.069 1.122 + 
Age Age category of renter (in years) 
 = 1      < 25   = 2   25–34   =3   35-44   = 4   45–54 yrs.   
 = 5   55–64   = 6   65–74  = 7   75+ yrs. 
3.772 1.20 - 
Practice 1 if selected conservation practices are used, 0 otherwise 0.444 0.497 ? 
Tillage Index of predicted soil loss by tillage practice on lease tract 1.724 0.658 ? 
Oral 1 if contract is an oral lease, 0 if contract is a written lease 0.589 0.492 + 
Density Population per square mile in county of leased land 29.63 74.72 - 
State 1 if lease is in Nebraska, 0 if lease is in South Dakota 0.626 0.484 ? 
     
 Percent of leased acres in:    
Irrpct Irrigated crop 25.54 39.27 - 
Haypct Hay 3.24 8.96 - 
Rngpct Pasture 6.71 15.79 - 
 
Source: 1996 Cropland Leasing Survey, Nebraska and South Dakota 
 
aThe bolded explanatory variables were used in the final logistic model reported by Allen and Leuck, 1992 
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Model Results for Croplease Decision 
 
A. Full Model I 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Odds 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -0.592 0.325 3.329 0.068  
ROWC -0.209 0.182 1.312 0.252 0.812 
IRRIGATE 0.108 0.140 0.596 0.440 1.114 
HAY -1.097 0.404 7.382 0.007 0.334 
ROWCHAY 1.229 0.440 7.811 0.005 3.419 
DENSITY -0.0001 0.00085 0.009 0.926 1.000 
ACRES -0.0001 0.00025 0.096 0.756 1.000 
INSTITUTION -0.509 0.268 3.612 0.057 0.601 
FAMILY 0.468 0.133 12.451 0.000 1.597 
AGE 0.211 0.060 12.169 0.001 1.235 
FARMINC 0.060 0.057 1.107 0.293 1.062 
CAPITAL -0.671 0.261 6.632 0.010 0.511 
      
N = 1071    C-index = 0.598 
-2 Log L = 1434.11 for intercept and covariates 
Chi square for covariates = 46.12 with 11 d.f. (p < 0.0001) 
Source: 1996 Nebraska/South Dakota Cropland Leasing Survey 
 
B. Stepwise Model I 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Odds 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -0.4462 0.2736 2.660 0.103  
ROWC -0.1710 0.1732 0.974 0.324 0.843 
HAY -1.1240 0.4005 7.876 0.005 0.325 
ROWCHAY 1.2296 0.4379 7.883 0.005 3.420 
INSTITUTION -0.4829 0.2666 3.280 0.070 0.617 
FAMILY 0.4836 0.1319 13.433 0.000 1.622 
AGE 0.2152 0.0602 12.795 0.000 1.240 
CAPITAL -0.6648 0.2544 6.827 0.009 0.514 
      
N = 1071     C-index = 0.599 
-2 Log L = 1434.11 for intercept and covariates 
Chi square for covariates = 44.13 with 7 d.f. (p = 0.0001) 
Variables removed: DENSITY, ACRES, IRRIGATE, FARMINC 
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C. Stepwise Model II 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Odds 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -1.1817 0.3065 14.869 0.0001  
ROWC -0.2802 0.1857 2.278 0.131 0.756 
HAY -0.9182 0.4183 4.818 0.028 0.399 
PASTURE -0.4805 0.1715 7.852 0.005 0.618 
ROWCHAY 1.1650 0.4521 6.639 0.010 3.206 
FAMILY 0.4512 0.1515 8.866 0.003 1.570 
ABSENT 0.4554 0.1718 7.031 0.008 1.557 
AGE 0.1727 0.0629 7.548 0.006 1.189 
CAPITAL -0.7336 0.2676 7.518 0.006 0.480 
ORAL 1.0943 0.1404 60.740 <.0001 2.987 
STATE 0.5044 0.1438 12.295 0.001 1.656 
      
N = 1071     C-index = 0.683 
-2 Log L = 1354.84 
Chi square for covariates = 121.95 with 10 d.f. (p < 0.0001) 
Variable removed: PRACTICE, IRRIGATE, INTITUTION, HAYPAST, TILLAGE, DENSITY, 
ACRES, ROWCPAST, FARMINC 
 
D. Stepwise Model III 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Chi-Square 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Odds 
Ratio 
      
Intercept -1.393 0.262 28.223 <.0001  
RNGPCT -0.018 0.0043 17.224 <.0001 0.982 
FAMILY 0.463 0.152 9.347 0.002 1.589 
ABSENT 0.476 0.171 7.694 0.005 1.609 
AGE 0.168 0.062 7.268 0.007 1.183 
CAPITAL -0.670 0.267 6.277 0.012 0.512 
ORAL 1.093 0.140 60.765 <.0001 2.983 
STATE 0.504 0.139 13.180 0.0001 1.655 
      
N = 1071     C-index = 0.685 
-2 Log L = 1350.07 for intercept and covariates 
Chi square for covariates = 130.16 with 15 d.f. (p < 0.0001) 
Variables removed: PRACTICE, TILLAGE, INTITUTION, IRRPCT, DENSITY, ACRES, 
HAYPCT, FARMINC 
 
